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FAMILY LAW—THE REVICTIMIZATION OF SURVIVORS !
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THEIR CHILDREN: THE
HEARTBREAKING UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF !
SEPARATING CHILDREN FROM THEIR ABUSED PARENT !
JEANNE M. KAISER & CAROLINE M. FOLEY*
Massachusetts law governing child custody recognizes the damaging
effect that witnessing domestic violence can have on a child.
Accordingly, the law requires courts to give special attention to the
effects of domestic violence on a child when determining custody. An
unintended consequence of this scrutiny is that parents who have been
the victims of domestic violence can lose custody, or even their
parental rights, for failing to protect children from witnessing their
abuse. This result can be prevented by requiring courts to apply the
same level of attention to the effects of domestic violence when
removing a child from an abused parent as they do when placing a
child with an abusive parent.

INTRODUCTION
Massachusetts law has played a leading role in recognizing the
particular type of harm children can suffer when they witness domestic
abuse. Since 1996, juvenile and family courts have been required to detail
the impact that witnessing domestic violence has on children before
awarding custody of a child to a perpetrator of such violence.1 Trial courts

* Jeanne M. Kaiser is a Professor of Legal Research and Writing at Western New England
University School of Law. She has also been a member of the appellate panel of the Children
and Family Law program of the Committee for Public Counsel Services in Massachusetts for
over twenty years. As a member of the panel, Professor Kaiser represents indigent parents and
children in appeals of child welfare cases. She also serves as a mentor for new members of the
panel. Caroline M. Foley is a candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of
Law, 2021, and a member of the Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor Kaiser
for her guidance throughout the writing of this piece.
1. See Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 439–40 (Mass. 1996).
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are required to consider the “profound impact” that being a witness to
domestic abuse can have on a child, especially during certain
developmental stages.2 Accordingly, courts must provide detailed and
specific findings about the effect of domestic abuse on a particular child
before making any custody decision that would place the care of a child
in the hands of a parent who has been abusive to a domestic partner.3
Massachusetts law has paid less attention to another side of the
problem of domestic violence. What about the parent who is the victim
of physical abuse? A parent who is caught in a cycle of domestic violence
might remain in an abusive relationship for a significant amount of time.
If she does not leave the relationship, her children may witness repeated
domestic abuse and suffer associated psychological harm. Does a mother
who remains in an abusive relationship neglect or psychologically abuse
her children? Should it affect whether her children remain in her custody?
When the state intervenes in child custody cases, the answer to these
questions is sometimes “yes.” It is not unusual in cases brought by the
Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) to include
allegations of failure to protect a child from witnessing domestic violence.
These cases cite the ruling in Custody of Vaughn regarding the pernicious
effects witnessing domestic violence has on children.4 In some instances,
they determine that a parent who is the victim of physical abuse is unable
to protect her children from witnessing that abuse and therefore unfit to
parent the child.5
They do not, however, necessarily follow Vaughn’s directive of
providing specific and detailed findings of fact about the effect of the
abuse on the particular child before removing the child from a parent’s
custody or even severing parental rights. The result of this practice can
prove more damaging to children than the effect of witnessing the abuse.
This result was clearly illustrated to one of the authors of this Article when
she represented a five-year-old child seeking on appeal to reverse a
judgment of the trial court keeping her separate from her mother. In that
case, the primary evidence of the mother’s unfitness was that she had a
history of being involved in abusive relationships witnessed by her older
children, and that therefore her “poor decision making” could subject her
five-year-old daughter to harm.6
That case illustrates the unfortunate corollary of the recognition of
the harmful effects of domestic violence on children. Courts may be too
ready to separate children from a parent who has been caught in a cycle
2. Id. at 439; see infra notes 57–60.
3. Id. at 440.
4. See infra note 31.
5. See infra note 63.
6. Care & Prot. of Umika, 140 N.E.3d 948 (Mass. App. Ct.), rev. denied, 143 N.E.3d
1037 (Mass. 2020).
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of domestic violence, primarily as a victim. That practice can have the
tragic effect of denying a child her constitutional right to be raised by her
parents and leave her indefinitely in the care of the state.7 In such cases,
failure to fully consider all aspects of the impact of domestic violence,
including the trauma of separation, can revictimize children with a parent
who has been caught in the cycle of domestic violence. At the same time,
it deprives a parent of their constitutional right to raise a child.8
This problem can be cured by requiring trial courts to take the same
care before removing a child from a parent who has suffered at the hands
of an abuser, as is required before placing a child with a parent who has a
history of perpetrating such abuse. The trial court should be required to
make findings about the effect of domestic violence on the particular child
whose welfare is at issue. In so doing, the court should assess the progress
a parent has made in escaping the cycle of domestic violence, while
recognizing that progress in such cases is rarely linear and often involves
multiple attempts to escape the cycle.9 The findings should also closely
examine to what degree DCF has fulfilled its duty to exercise reasonable
efforts to reunify the family.10 Those efforts should be specifically
tailored to assist a parent in extracting themselves from abusive
circumstances. Finally, and most importantly, the court should be
required to carefully weigh the risk that a parent would expose a child to
new incidents of domestic violence against the impact of indefinite
impermanence and separation from the parent on the child.11 These
findings are just as important in cases where a parent has been a victim of
domestic violence as when the parent has been a perpetrator.
I.

CUSTODY OF VAUGHN: THE UNINTENDED EFFECT OF SEPARATING $
CHILDREN FROM THEIR ABUSED PARENT $
Vaughn was the first case in the nation to require consideration of the
impact of domestic violence on children in the custody context.12 It
prioritized in a new way the negative effects that exposure to domestic
violence has on children13 by holding that a court must make specific
findings of fact regarding the impact of the abuse prior to awarding a
child’s custody to an abuser.14

7. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (both parent and child have a
constitutionally protected interest in their family relationship).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part III, Section B.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part III, Section C.
12. Philip C. Crosby, Case Comment, Custody of Vaughn: Emphasizing the Importance
of Domestic Violence in Child Custody Cases, 77 B.U. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997).
13. Id.
14. Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Mass. 1996).
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In Vaughn, the court found that Vaughn’s father, Ross, physically and
verbally abused Vaughn’s mother, Leslie.15 The testimony in Probate and
Family Court revealed that Ross “‘would fly into rages’ and strike out at
Leslie.”16 Vaughn witnessed a lot of the violence.17 In October 1992,
Leslie obtained a restraining order against Ross, which forced him to leave
the house.18 On the following day, Ross filed an action to establish
paternity of Vaughn and obtain his custody.19
In 1993, the Probate and Family Court awarded Vaughn’s primary
physical custody to his father.20 The mother filed a complaint on appeal
based on the judge’s “lack of comprehensive findings on the issue of the
father’s physical abuse of her as it relates to his fitness.”21 The Appeals
Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to the
Probate and Family Court for consideration of evidence regarding the
effect that exposure to domestic violence had on Vaughn.22 The Appeals
Court noted that at trial, an expert psychologist testified that Vaughn
suffered from the typical emotional problems experienced by children
who witness their mothers’ abuse, including depression, sadness, anxiety,
and responsibility for the batterer’s wellbeing.23
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) agreed with the
Appeals Court that the judge “fail[ed] to make detailed and
comprehensive findings of fact on the issues of domestic violence and its
effect upon the child as well as upon the father’s parenting ability.”24 The
Appeals Court also gave weight to the Gender Bias Study of the Court
System of Massachusetts (Gender Bias Study) highlighting that “appellate
courts should make it clear that abuse of any family member affects other
family members and must be considered in determining the best interests
of the child in connection with any order concerning custody.”25
The court explained the need to address domestic violence in custody
cases other than by implication due to its high frequency.26 The court
concluded that “[r]equiring the courts to make explicit findings about the
15. Id. at 435.
16. Id.
17. R.H. v. B.F., 653 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Custody of
Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434 (Mass. 1996).
18. Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d. at 436.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 434.
21. R.H., 653 N.E.2d at 196.
22. Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d at 434.
23. R.H., 653 N.E.2d at 200.
24. Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d at 438 (alteration in original) (quoting R.H., 653 N.E.2d at 201).
25. Id. at 437 (quoting MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE
SUPREME
JUDICIAL
COURT
(1989),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/127983NCJRS.pdf).
26. Id. at 439–40.
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effect of the violence on the child and the appropriateness of the custody
award in light of that effect will serve to keep these matters well in the
foreground of the judges’ thinking.”27 Ultimately, the court held that a
child who is exposed to domestic violence suffers a “distinctly grievous
kind of harm,”28 especially during important developmental stages.29
Following Vaughn, courts must make specific “Vaughn findings”
about the extent of domestic violence, its effect on children, and how it
impacts the abuser’s parenting.30 Vaughn has been expanded to include
the analysis of other factors such as history of domestic violence, whether
a parent has sought help, negative effects of violence on children, and
whether the parent understands the negative effects of children being
exposed to violence.31 Moreover, Vaughn findings must be made even if
the information presented to the court is dated and disputed.32
Comprehensive findings on domestic violence, when making custody
determinations, are required in proceedings pursuant to the Massachusetts
General Law which governs the removal of children from their parents’
custody and termination of parental rights.33 Consequently, Vaughn has
not only affected custody proceedings between parents, but also custody
proceedings between parents and the state.
An irony exists regarding the application of Vaughn in state-involved
custody cases. The SJC’s focus on the Gender Bias Study and the impact
of domestic abuse on women makes it clear that the court was concerned
about the pervasiveness of domestic violence against women and the
deprivation of their human right to be safe.34 Nonetheless, an unintended

27. Id. at 440.
28. Id. at 437.
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id. at 437.
31. See, e.g., Adoption of Will, No. 10-P-416, 2010 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1236
(2010), aff’d, 937 N.E.2d 73 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010); Adoption of Ramon, 672 N.E.2d 574, 578
(Mass. App. Ct. 1996). The Massachusetts legislature has also acknowledged the concerns
reflected in Vaughn by enacting a statute related to the impact of exposure to domestic violence
on children. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31A (2018) (created a rebuttable presumption that
evidence of past or present abuse goes against the best interest of the child when awarding
custody).
32. In re Lillith, 807 N.E.2d 237, 243 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
33. Id.
34. Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d at 437.
Quite simply, abuse by a family member inflicted on those who are weaker and
less able to defend themselves—almost invariably a child or a woman—is a
violation of the most basic human right . . . . [F]orce within the family and in
intimate relationships is not less but more of a threat to this basic condition of
civilized security, for it destroys the security that all should enjoy in the very place
and context which is supposed to be the refuge against the harshness encountered
in a world of strangers.
Id.
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consequence is that the holding in Vaughn has been applied in ways that
can punish women for being abused by their partners by endangering their
right to custody of their children. Likewise, children can be further
victimized by being separated from their abused parent due to the abuser’s
acts of violence.
II. POST VAUGHN: THE LACK OF PARTICULARIZED ASSESSMENT OF A $
CHILD WHO HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE $
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT $
A. The Law Governing Termination of Parental Rights
The application of Vaughn to care and protection proceedings arises
when its ruling is applied to cases evaluating whether to remove children
from their families of origin. These cases are enormously consequential.
Termination of parental rights (TPR) permanently severs the relationship
between a parent and child.35 In this way, it is different from the custody
decision contemplated in Vaughn. There, the SJC questioned whether the
father should have physical custody of his son despite his history of
domestic violence. It did not, however, completely terminate the parentchild relationship.36
The decision to terminate parental rights altogether, involves “an
exceptionally far-reaching exercise of State power.”37 Indeed, because of
the “irrevocable” nature of severing parental rights, the action should only
be taken when children’s welfare “demands” it.38 Such cases are of
constitutional dimension: the parent-child relationship implicates a
fundamental right,39 parents have the right to raise their children,40 and
families have the right to live together.41
Noting the magnitude of these rights, in 1972, the Supreme Court in
Stanley held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, all parents are
constitutionally entitled to a fitness hearing before the children are

35. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 26 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (2018).
36. See Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d at 437.
37. Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
38. Id.
39. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977)
(holding that “the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily
to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in ‘this
Nation’s history and tradition’” (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977))).
40. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (recognizing parents’ liberty
interest in “establish[ing] a home and bring[ing] up children”).
41. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845.

KAISER: FOLEY 167 PAGE.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

SURVIVOR REVICTIMIZATION

11/3/21 10:15 PM

173

removed from their custody.42 The Supreme Court ruled on the
importance of due process during custody termination proceedings, and
determined that states must establish “individual proof” on parent’s
neglect to deter violation of the Equal Protection Clause.43 In Stanley, the
Court held that the Illinois law that presumed that unmarried fathers were
“unsuitable and neglectful parents” was a violation of due process because
parental unfitness “must be established on basis of individual proof.”44
Ten years after Stanley, the Supreme Court ruled in Santosky that a
state must prove by clear and convincing evidence allegations against the
parents before terminating their rights.45 The Court held that the
preponderance of evidence standard does not satisfy the due process
clause.46 The Court ruled that states must prove their allegation against
parents by clear and convincing evidence.47 In the decision, the Court
stated that the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents.”48 The Court highlighted the
importance of states providing parents with “fundamentally fair
procedures.”49 Santosky held that even after parents are found unfit in a
proceeding, they retain constitutionally protected parental rights.50
Under Massachusetts law, the constitutional protections surrounding
the burden of proof kicks in when DCF seeks permanent custody of a
child.51 The standard of proof in permanent custody cases, or cases in
which DCF seeks termination of parental rights, allowing for the child to
be adopted, is clear and convincing.52
42. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972).
43. Id. at 657.
44. Id. at 645.
45. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982).
46. Id. at 759.
47. Id. at 746.
48. Id. at 753.
49. Id. at 754.
50. Id. at 745.
51. At earlier stages of a custody case, a lesser burden of proof exists. DCF can petition
a court for emergency custody of a child in an ex-parte hearing. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 24 (2018). DCF is required to show that the child is either suffering from severe abuse or
neglect; in imminent danger of severe abuse or neglect; or that removal is necessary to prevent
severe abuse or neglect. Id. The standard of proof at this stage is low: DCF is required to show
only that there is “reasonable cause” to believe that such circumstances exist. Id. However,
parents are entitled to a temporary custody hearing within seventy-two hours of the child’s
removal. At that stage, the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Id.
52. Adoption of Carlos, 596 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (Mass. 1992). There is a difference
between placing a child in the permanent custody of DCF (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 26(b)
(2018)) and terminating parental rights. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (2018). When DCF is
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In accord with these constitutional protections, in Massachusetts
courts, DCF bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that a parent is unfit to further the best interests of a child.53 Moreover,
the court can grant custody to DCF only if it is in the child’s best interest.54
The assessment of parental unfitness and best interests are intertwined.55
Parental unfitness in Massachusetts is determined by looking at a
“parent’s character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to provide for the
child in the same context with the child’s particular needs.”56 The
question is not whether a parent is an ideal parent, or even a good one, but
rather whether the parent is “so bad as to place the child at serious risk of
peril from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child.”57 Trial
courts must make “specific and detailed findings [of fact] demonstrating
that close attention has been [paid to] the evidence” before transferring a
child’s custody to the state.58 The findings must show why the parents are
unfit.59 The findings must also state the reasons supporting the
conclusion.60 Lastly, there must be a nexus between the state’s allegations
of parental deficits and “the inability to safely parent.”61
B. Intersection of Vaughn and Massachusetts Child Protection Law
The above standards provide a measure of protection to parents who
are victims of domestic violence in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
First, the clear and convincing standard should protect the parents when
the primary evidence of unfitness lies with the parent exposing the child
to domestic violence. Second, the general requirement of specific and
detailed findings requires a court to substantiate parental unfitness and the
child’s best interest with great particularity. Finally, the requirement to
make Vaughn findings should mean that the court focuses closely on the
granted “permanent custody,” parental rights remain to some degree alive. The parent has the
right to request review and redetermination of the custody order every six months. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 26(c) (2018). At that point, if there has been a substantial change of
circumstances, custody can be returned to the parent. In re Erin, 823 N.E.2d 356, 360–61 (Mass.
2005). In termination of parental rights cases, the parents’ rights are completely severed. The
child is then free to be adopted by another parent or parents. Carlos, 596 N.E.2d at 1389.
53. ch. 119, § 26; see Adoption of Ramona, 809 N.E.2d 547, 552 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
54. Adoption of Zoltan, 881 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
55. In re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Mass. 1975)
(“[T]he tests [for unfitness and best interests] are not separate and distinct but cognate and
connected.”).
56. Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Mass. 1993).
57. Care & Prot. of Bruce, 694 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
58. Custody of a Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 75 (Mass. 1979).
59. See Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 260–61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
60. See Adoption of Stuart, 656 N.E.2d 916, 922–23 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
61. Adoption of Zoltan, 881 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
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effect of exposure to domestic violence on an individual child.
Nonetheless, a review of cases that apply Vaughn in the care and
protection arena establishes that its use can border on tautological. The
SJC’s statement in Vaughn that children generally suffer a “profound”
impact and a “distinctly grievous kind of harm”62 when they witness
domestic violence is repeatedly cited in cases as proving a child inevitably
either has suffered or will suffer harm.63 Appellate courts have not
enforced Vaughn’s mandate of specific and detailed findings about the
impact of witnessing domestic violence on children64 Instead, they have
allowed courts to rely on a more general connection between child wellbeing and exposure to domestic violence.
Notably, the Appeals Court has read Vaughn not to require any
particularized assessment of a child exposed to domestic violence. In
Adoption of Bianca, the Court of Appeals endorsed the trial court’s finding
that a father was unfit after he exposed his infant daughter to repeated
episodes of domestic violence.65 The court determined there was no need
for expert testimony regarding the effect that exposure to domestic
violence would have on a child during her first fourteen months of life.66
Instead, relying on the oft-repeated statements in Vaughn, the court ruled
that in cases where a child witnesses domestic abuse there was no need to
document psychological damage to the child.67 Instead, the harm could
be presumed because of the natural impact of physical violence in a child’s
daily life.68
Not only can the harm be presumed, but the court can proactively
protect a child from exposure to domestic violence before it happens. In

62. Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 437 (Mass. 1996).
63. See, e.g., Adoption of Gillian, 826 N.E.2d 742, 748 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (stating
domestic violence in a family is “highly relevant” to the determination of parental unfitness);
Adoption of Ramon, 672 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). A large number of cases
decided pursuant to the Appeals Court Rule 1:28 cite exposure of children to domestic violence
as an important consideration in the determination of parental unfitness. See, e.g., Adoption of
Gilberto, 145 N.E.3d 907 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020); In re Adoption of Scarlet, 47 N.E.3d 703
(Mass. App. Ct. 2016); In re Adoption of Blaine, 45 N.E.3d 611 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016);
Adoption of Karyn, 3 N.E.3d 111 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); In re Adoption of Rose, 984 N.E.2d
315 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013); In re Adoption of Marta, 965 N.E.2d 900 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012);
Care & Prot. of Joan, 938 N.E.2d 906 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). The frequent use of Rule 1:28 in
such cases is troublesome because it can have the effect of hiding a pattern of assuming fault on
the part of a parent who exposes a child to her own abuse.
64. See, e.g., Care & Prot. of Umika, No. 19-P-666, 2020 WL 412872 (Mass. App. Ct.
2020), rev. denied, 143 N.E.3d 1037 (Mass. 2020).
65. Adoption of Bianca, 75 N.E.3d 1140, 1145 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (the court nonetheless found that, in this particular case, there was evidence that
the child had suffered psychological damage from witnessing the abuse).
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an unpublished decision,69 the court determined that a father with a long
history of abusing his female partners was unfit to parent his son, thus
severing their relationship entirely.70 The court relied on expert testimony
from a psychologist that continued exposure to domestic violence could
end up harming the child.71 The court cited Vaughn regarding the
potentially harmful effects of such exposure72 and ruled that it was not
required to wait until that harm actually occurred.73 Instead, it terminated
the father’s parental rights because of the substantial likelihood that the
father would become involved in additional abusive relationships that
would harm the child.74
The Appeals Court’s reliance on Vaughn also extends to cases in
which there is no evidence that the child witnessed the domestic violence
between parents who have purportedly separated. In Adoption of Yale, the
court ruled that the rights of both parents who had “recurring violent
disputes” could be terminated to protect the child’s future.75 The lack of
proof of a current, abusive relationship also does not stand as a barrier to
termination of parental rights partly on the ground that a parent might
expose the child to domestic violence.76 In In re Bancroft, the trial court
did not credit the mother’s assertion that her current relationship did not
involve abuse, even though there was no evidence otherwise.77 The
Appeals Court determined that the trial court did not improperly shift the
burden of proof to the mother because it was “entitled to discredit the
mother’s uncontroverted testimony” and instead determined there was no
credible evidence on the issue.78 In other cases, courts have determined
69. The Massachusetts Appeals Court frequently uses its Rule 23, formerly known as
Rule 1:28, in termination of parental rights cases. The rule permits the court to issue decisions
without precedential value that bind only the parties in the case. MASS. APP. CT. R. 23(1).
These decisions are addressed primarily to the parties and as such do not fully address the facts
or all aspects of the decisional process. Chace v. Curran, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n.4 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2008). However, electronic research has made these cases more available to attorneys. Id.
Therefore, the court now permits attorneys to cite these cases in briefs as persuasive authority
if they were decided after February 26, 2008. MASS. APP. CT. R. 23(2).
70. Adoption of Will, No. 10-P-416, 2010 WL 4628736, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
71. Id. at *4.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id.
75. Adoption of Yale, No. 12-P-1759, 2013 WL 2184616, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
76. See In re Bancroft, No. 13-P-1963, 2014 WL 6089905, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id.; see also Care & Prot. of Polly, 87 N.E.3d 1201, 2017 WL 3400656 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2017). In Care and Protection of Polly, the trial court found that the mother’s ongoing
pattern of being involved in abusive relationships rendered her an unfit parent. Id. at *2.
Although the mother was not in such a relationship at the time of the care and protection
proceedings, the court found that “insufficient time” had elapsed to show that she had broken
the pattern of abuse. Id. An irony in this case is that the children were placed in the custody of
their father, who was one of the men who had abused the mother. Id. at *4.
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harm to the child persists even when the violence was infrequent or
occurred years ago.79
In short, a reflexive use of the holding in Vaughn can result in an
assumption that children who witnessed domestic violence are so
inevitably and unalterably damaged that leaving them in the custody of
their parents is presumptively wrong. Such a presumption has grave
constitutional problems.80 But even putting these problems aside, this
assumption is especially troublesome when the parent is the victim of
violence, not the perpetrator. It is not unusual for parental rights to be
terminated, at least partially, on the ground that a mother has not protected
a child from witnessing a man physically abuse her.81 A real concern
arises when a court relies primarily, or solely, on evidence that a parent
suffered abuse. In these cases, courts focus on Vaughn’s assertion that a
“grievous kind of harm” will result when a child is exposed to domestic
violence. Unfortunately, the courts will often fail to take a careful look at
the child’s specific circumstances as mandated by Vaughn.
The problem is aptly illustrated by the recent Massachusetts Appeals
Court summary decision in Care and Protection of Umika.82 That case
involved a then five-year-old girl who had been in the custody of DCF for
over half her life. Her mother had been in a succession of relationships
that involved domestic abuse, in which she was primarily the victim. Her
older children had witnessed a substantial amount of physical conflict, but
there was no evidence that Umika had witnessed any incident of domestic
violence. In fact, all but one of the episodes of domestic violence
described at the care and protection trial occurred before Umika was even
born. Umika was removed from her mother’s custody and placed in DCF
custody after that single incident. She was a little under two years old at
the time.83
Umika lived in a succession of foster homes after her removal, always
79. See, e.g., In re Lillith, 807 N.E.2d 237, 243–45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that a
single act of violence which occurred six years prior to trial warranted remand for specific
findings on the impact of domestic violence); In re Adoption of Zak, 32 N.E.3d 361 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2015) (holding that the trial judge properly considered an incident of abuse towards
the mother which occurred five years prior to trial).
80. See In re Dep’t of Soc. Serv. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 452 N.E.2d 497,
503 (Mass. 1983) (holding that the statutory presumption of parental unfitness when a child has
been in state custody for over one year is unconstitutional because it shifts the burden of proof
to the parent).
81. See infra Part III, Section B.
82. Care & Prot. of Umika, No. 19-P-666, 2020 WL 412872 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020), rev.
denied, 143 N.E.3d 1037 (Mass. 2020). One of the authors of this Article served as appellate
counsel to Umika (a pseudonym).
83. Some of the information about Umika’s case is based on counsel’s familiarity with
the entire record in this matter. See supra text accompanying note 82. The Appeals Court
decision, pursuant to Rule 1:28, does not provide a full explication of the facts. See supra text
accompanying note 69.
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apart from her siblings. The mother challenged her continued placement
with DCF and, shortly before the trial began, Umika was placed with her
maternal grandmother. During the interim, between Umika’s removal and
the beginning of trial, the mother ended her relationship with her abusive
partner. She participated in domestic violence training and entered
therapy. At trial, her therapist testified on her behalf about her consistent
participation and the progress she had made over time. DCF required the
mother to have a psychological evaluation, and the psychologist who
performed the evaluation testified as an expert witness at trial. The
psychologist testified to the mother’s new understanding of domestic
abuse dynamics. The psychologist opined that this understanding, plus
the two years that had elapsed since she had been in an abusive
relationship, made it unlikely that the mother would expose Umika to
domestic abuse in the future. The trial court also heard evidence of
Umika’s continuing bond with her mother. Even though Umika had not
been in her mother’s custody for over two years, she remained very
attached to her. During visits, she would run straight to her mother and
cuddle up with her. She sometimes had to be physically separated from
her at the end of the visit.
Nonetheless, the trial court remained concerned that if it returned
custody of Umika to her mother, she would expose her to domestic
violence.84 The court did not terminate the mother’s parental rights, as
DCF requested. Instead, it left Umika in DCF custody, leaving her
permanently in limbo. The Appeals Court upheld the trial court’s decision
on the ground that an incident of domestic violence two years prior to the
trial was recent enough to justify the trial court’s decision that the
mother’s “poor decision making” could lead to Umika’s harm.85 It further
reasoned that, if the mother continued to show progress, she could petition
for review at some later date and perhaps be reunited with Umika.86
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court considered the fact that
there was no evidence that exposure to domestic abuse had ever had an
adverse effect on Umika. Indeed, there was no definitive evidence that
she had ever actually witnessed domestic violence. More importantly,
neither court considered the potentially disastrous effect of indefinitely
denying permanency to a child who was almost six years old at the time
the appeal was resolved. By the end of the appeal, Umika was no closer
to having a permanent home than the day she was removed from her
mother’s custody.87
84. Umika, 2020 WL 412872, at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *4.
87. The Appeals Court did not address Umika’s argument on appeal that pursuant to
Custody of Vaughn, the trial court should have made specific and detailed findings regarding
the effect of domestic violence on Umika. The only comment on this issue was contained in a
footnote stating that “[t]his argument lacks merit because Umika was developing normally and
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The same result would not necessarily have occurred in a different
jurisdiction where the fundamental premise of removing children from the
custody of a parent for failure to protect them from witnessing abuse is
subject to closer questioning. For instance, a New Jersey appellate court
determined that particularized evidence was necessary before removing a
toddler from her mother’s care for failure to protect her from witnessing
domestic violence.88 In that case, the court reversed the trial court’s
conclusion that the mother abused her child when she did not pursue a
restraining order against her husband, and sought to reduce his bail, after
he hit her while she was holding the child.89 Just as in Umika’s case, the
trial court did not provide findings that the child exhibited signs of harm
stemming from the incident.90 Moreover, like in Umika’s case, the judge
made no findings based on expert testimony that harm was likely to result
from the incident.91 Finally, in both cases, the trial court made no findings
that weighed any potential harm caused by the abuse to the emotional
harm caused by removal. 92 Instead, the court held that a trial judge could
not simply “take judicial notice . . . that domestic violence [necessarily]
begets emotional distress or [some] other psychic injury in child
witnesses.”93 If this standard was applied in Umika’s case, she would
likely be living with her mother right now, instead of remaining
indefinitely in DCF custody.
The Second Circuit considered the same issue in the context of a
constitutional challenge to New York’s policy of removing children from
a parent on the grounds that the parent has been abused by a partner.94 The
Second Circuit deferred on the constitutional question and instead
certified the issue to New York’s highest state court.95 However, it noted
the district court’s concerns with the New York policy.96 The district court
determined that studies were divided on whether witnessing domestic
violence was uniformly harmful to children, and that in fact some
academic literature argues that such harm is uncertain and rare.97 The
did not have any identified special needs.” Id. at *3 n.13. But the fact that Umika did not have
diagnosable “special needs” certainly does not mean that she lacks specific needs that any court
should consider before making a judgment about her best interests. The SJC rejected Umika’s
petition of further appellate review. Umika, 143 N.E.3d 1037 (Mass. 2020).
88. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 855 A.2d 8, 13–14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004).
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 15.
94. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
95. Id. at 175.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 174 (citing Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law and Social
Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable
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district court also noted that the possible effects of witnessing abuse must
be weighed against the significant evidence that removing children from
a parent is a “significant source of stress and emotional trauma, especially
for young children,” and that removal can “intensify the trauma of the
violence by removing the child’s best coping mechanism, the parent, and
encouraging feelings of self-blame.”98 The district court recognized that
a blanket presumption in favor of removal would fail to capture the
nuances of each family situation.99 The policy of removing children on
this basis could backfire because abused parents would be reluctant to
report abuse if they feared child protective services would then remove
their children.100
III. VAUGHN FINDINGS SHOULD BE MADE WHENEVER BASING A
CHILD CUSTODY DECISION ON THE FAILURE TO PROTECT FROM $
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE $
Enforcement of Vaughn’s requirement of specific and detailed
findings regarding the impact of domestic violence on children will help
mitigate the problem of improper separation of children from a parent who
is the victim of domestic abuse. Moreover, in making such findings,
courts should be required to consider three important considerations.
First, the court should recognize that breaking free of an abusive
relationship is a process and may be difficult to accomplish in a single
action. Next, the court should consider whether DCF has satisfied its own
obligation to exercise reasonable efforts to provide services that can help
a parent break free of abuse. Finally, the court should weigh the risks
associated with separation of the child from the parent with the risks
associated with being a witness to domestic violence.
A. Recognizing the Cycle of Domestic Violence
The trial court’s findings about abused parents whose children
witness domestic violence should reflect the complexities of the
phenomenon. Parents who fail to leave a relationship after even multiple
Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1499–
1506 (2001)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. When New York’s highest court took up the Second Circuit’s certified questions,
it determined that evidence that a parent allowed a child to witness domestic violence without
more was insufficient to satisfy New York’s statutory definition of a neglected child. Nicholson
v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2004). In examining New York’s statutory child
protection scheme, the court noted the helpfulness of expert testimony in assessing
particularized harm to the child, although such evidence is not required. Id. at 855. It also
stressed that a court should examine the frequency and severity of the abuse, and the escape
routes available to a parent who may fear her life is in danger if she leaves an abusive partner.
Id. at 846.
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serious episodes of domestic violence might be assumed to be acting in an
obtuse or careless way without concern for the welfare of their children.
The reality is that they can be trapped in a system with multiple causes
that is difficult to escape.
A parent may have a pattern of leaving an abusive partner, only to
return on a number of occasions before ending the relationship.101 The
reasons for that behavior are multifaceted. Generally, victims of domestic
violence have internal and external barriers that keep them in a cycle of
violence.102 The external barriers include lack of stable employment,
housing, childcare, and lack of trust in law enforcement support.103
“Established patterns of abuse and control might mean that an abused
party has become so isolated from friends, family, and employment that
they have nowhere to go if they were to permanently leave.”104 The
abusive partner may also control the couple’s money and cut off access to
funds.105
Significantly, victims fear greater injury as the risk of homicide or
injury is higher following the first three months after separation.106 Thus,
leaving a partner may be more dangerous than staying in place. Other
internal barriers include guilt, shame, low self-esteem, and mental health
issues.107
Any court assessing a parent’s fitness should take into account the
struggles faced in abusive circumstances before assuming that leaving an
abusive relationship is simply a matter of volition. The court’s findings
of fact should explicitly assess factors that stand in the way of a parent
from removing herself from a relationship infected with domestic
violence.108
B. Parenting Abilities of Parents Who Have Experienced Domestic

101. Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 679 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)
(describing expert testimony on “battered woman’s syndrome”).
102. AMANDA GOODSON & LEANA A. BOUFFARD, CRIME VICTIMS INST., BREAKING
CYCLE
OF
INTIMATE
PARTNER
VIOLENCE
(2016),
THE
http://dev.cjcenter.org/_files/cvi/breaking-cycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DHT-SV5W].
103. Id.
104. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 29 N.E.3d 856, 867–868 n.13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015)
(citing V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered
Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 246 (1996).
105. Id.
106. V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 235–46 (1996).
107. Id. at 235–36.
108. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 846–47 (N.Y. 2004) (imposing
obligation on courts to consider the frequency and severity of abuse, the resources available to
the parent, and the risks accompanying criminal prosecution when determining whether a parent
has exercised the “minimum degree of care” required under New York law).

KAISER: FOLEY 167 PAGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

182

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

11/3/21 10:15 PM

[Vol. 43:167

Violence
Courts should also take into account that being a victim of abuse does
not necessarily reflect on the ability to be a good parent. Studies have
shown that abused women are not better or worse parents than non-abused
women.109 In fact, many women develop strategies to protect their
children through their “spirit, endurance, and determination.”110
Importantly, the evidence shows that it is possible for victims to break
free from the cycle of violence and provide a safe environment for their
children, especially when they receive appropriate services.111 Victims
who use services like advocacy centers, shelters, and counseling are more
likely to remove the internal and external barriers listed above.112 When
they have access to these services, victims are less likely to experience
violence in the future; they also perceived improved decision-making, and
coping skills.113 Additionally, victims report having better quality of life
and the ability to access other community resources more easily.114
Often, relatively short-term services can have a major beneficial
impact on women who are victims of abuse. For instance, a study that a
trained college student advocates to help 135 victims obtain access to
community services found that after only ten weeks, victims who worked
with advocates experienced less physical and psychological abuse than
victims who did not have access to any services.115 Another study showed
that after six weeks of advocacy support through a law school clinic,
participants reported significantly lower levels of physical abuse in
comparison to women in the control group.116 Moreover, studies have also
shown that women who were supported in domestic violence shelters
reported having more safety strategies and feeling safer.117 This study
interviewed 3,410 women from 215 shelters across eight states when they

109. See George W. Holden & Kathy L. Ritchie, Linking Extreme Marital Discord, Child
Rearing, and Child Behavior Problems: Evidence from Battered Women, 62 CHILD DEV. 311,
324 (1991).
110. Margo Lindauer, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Why Multi-CourtInvolved Battered Mothers Just Can’t Win, 20 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 797, 816 (2012).
111. Larry Bennett et al., Effectiveness of Hotline, Advocacy, Counseling, and Shelter
Services for Victims of Domestic Violence, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 815 (2004).
112. Id. at 825–27.
113. Id. at 826.
114. Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Reducing Violence Using Community-Based
Advocacy for Women with Abusive Partners, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 43, 49–
52 (1999).
115. Id. at 49–50.
116. See Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for
Policy and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 482–
85 (2005).
117. ELEANOR LYON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., MEETING SURVIVORS’ NEEDS: A
MULTI-STATE STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER EXPERIENCES 80–83 (2008).
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entered and exited the shelter.118
In a study conducted to look specifically into a victim’s parenting,
participants reported higher parental self-efficacy after three months of
support groups.119 Lastly, the Illinois Department of Human Services
evaluated eighty-seven state-funded agencies that supported victims of
domestic violence.120 The study suggested that victims improved their
decision-making and sense of self-efficacy when participating in
advocacy groups and counseling.121 The report also highlighted the
importance of housing and employment for victims to break free from the
cycle of violence.122
The services and resources highlighted in these studies have provided
support for parents and contributed to their ability to break free from
violence. Not only it is possible for victims to break free from the cycle
of domestic violence through these support systems, but victims can
improve their parenting skills as well. Consequently, the court’s findings
should relate to what degree parents have been able to take advantage of
such services.
In that regard, the findings should also reflect the degree to which
DCF has satisfied its obligation to exercise reasonable efforts to keep the
family together.123 DCF is required to “match services with needs” and
the trial court must be vigilant in assuring it meets this obligation.124 To
fulfill its obligation, the trial court’s findings should outline specifically
how DCF linked the parent with the types of services described above:
services that help parents cope with the cycle of domestic violence. The
court should not be satisfied with boilerplate provisions of services such
as referring parents to a domestic violence class. Parents facing the thicket
of issues associated with domestic violence need encouragement and
support from their DCF social workers, not a list of tasks to complete.125
118. Id. at 4–5.
119. Einat Peled et al., The Mothering of Women Abused by Their Partner: An Outcome
Evaluation of a Group Intervention, 20 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 391, 394–96 (2010).
120. Bennett et al., supra note 111, at 819.
121. Id. at 826.
122. Id. at 827.
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2018). This statute requires DCF to use
reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their home. Once removal has occurred,
DCF has a continuing obligation to use reasonable efforts to reunite the family. The juvenile
court must periodically certify that DCF has satisfied these obligations. The requirement is in
accord with the Commonwealth’s priority of keeping families together. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
119, § 1 (2018).
124. Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); see also
Adoption of Ilona, 944 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Mass. 2011).
125. Trial counsel for a parent experiencing domestic violence can be very useful in
holding DCF to its obligation to employ reasonable efforts. Trial counsel must bring
deficiencies in DCF’s performance to the attention of the trial court at the earliest possible stage
of the proceedings. See Adoption of West, 144 N.E.3d 938, 943 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020);
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C. ! Variable Effect of Witnessing Domestic Violence on Children
The court must also determine the effect that witnessing domestic
violence has had on the particular children involved. There is no simple
formula. Researchers confirm that “no single theory or even combination
of theories can explain how children are affected by marital violence.”126
It is important to understand the degree to which a child was harmed as
well as different factors unique to the child. Many studies have shown the
importance of the child maintaining the bond they have with their nonabusive parent to move forward and minimize the negative effects of
exposure to violence.127 Researchers encourage a “holistic” family
systems approach to intervention that considers family safety, support,
and evaluates the child in conjunction with her caretaker.128
The Office of Child Abuse and Neglect manual divides children’s
exposure to domestic violence into three categories: hearing a violent
event, being an eyewitness, and/or experiencing the aftermath of the
violence.129 The manual further describes that children who are exposed
to domestic violence are at risk of neglect, abuse, and higher levels of
emotional and cognitive problems.130 Additionally, with regard to longterm effects, adults who repeatedly witnessed violence as children
struggle with depression, low self-esteem, substance abuse, and engage in
dangerous behavior.131
Despite acknowledging the negative effects, the manual also states
that children’s reaction to domestic violence vary significantly.132 The
reaction depends upon the child’s resiliency, self-esteem, and the presence
or absence of a strong relationship with the non-abusive parent.133
Furthermore, the manual lists factors that can reduce the impact of
domestic violence: the frequency and severity of the violence witnessed,
coping skills, gender, age, time since exposure, support systems, and

Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 2001) (holding that parents waive claims
that DCF did not comply with the reasonable efforts requirement if they wait until TPR
proceedings to bring them).
126. Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging
a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable Solution When Her Child
Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1506 (2001).
127. See Dorota Iwaniec et al., Research Review: Risk and Resilience in Cases of
Emotional Abuse, 11 CHILD FAM. SOC. WORK 73 (2006).
128. HOWARD DAVIDSON, ABA CTR. ON CHILD. AND THE LAW, THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 5 (1994).
129. H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN
FAMILIES
EXPERIENCING
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
9
(2003),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/domesticviolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2FB-UJZ4].
130. ( Id. at 10.
131. ( Id.
132. ( Id. at 11.
133. ( Id.
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whether there was also child abuse present.134
Although some exposed children show more aggressive and fearful
behaviors,135 other children are more resilient to the negative effects and
have no greater emotional problems than the children not exposed to
domestic violence.136 In fact, many researchers point to the importance of
the child’s relationship to the non-abusive parent to minimize the negative
effects.137 One of the research studies indicates that although domestic
violence is a “high risk” context for child development, the parent-child
relationship is crucial for the child’s development of resilience and
competence.138 When a parent is not present, the child is at high risk for
not adapting to life after exposure to violence.139 Another study highlights
caregivers and role models as an important factor in predicting how
violence will shape a child’s adult life.140
The more family members in protective roles that are available to the
child, the more resilient a child may become.141 UNICEF indicates the
importance of parent-child relationship support in the child’s healing
process.142 They state that children need a “sense of routine and
normalcy” and the presence of a reliable and caring adult with whom they
are close to.143 Furthermore, they highlight the importance of children
seeing that violence at home can end, and that violence is a crime where
victims will be protected.144
The Office of Child Abuse and Neglect manual states that “[t]he
safety of abused children often is linked to the safety of the adult victims.
By helping victims of domestic violence secure protection, the well-being
of the children also is enhanced.”145 Furthermore, the manual states that
134. Id. at 11–12.
135. See generally Katherine M. Kitzmann et al., Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence:
A Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 339, 339–52 (2003); David
A. Wolfe et al., The Effect of Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis and
Critique, 6 CLINICAL CHILD FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 171–87 (2003).
136. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN 237–67
(Sandra A. Graham-Bermann & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2001).
137. See Iwaniec, supra note 127; Ann S. Masten & J. Douglas Coatsworth, The
Development of Competence in Favorable and Unfavorable Environments: Lessons from
Research on Successful Children, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 205 (1998).
138. Masten & Coatsworth, supra note 137, at 212.
139. Id. at 212–13.
140. See Iwaniec, supra note 127, at 77.
141. Ann S. Masten & Marie-Gabrielle J. Reed, Resilience in Development, in
HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 74, 74–88 (C.R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002).
142. UNICEF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 9
(2006), https://www.unicef.org/media/files/BehindClosedDoors.pdf [https://perma.cc/T99Y6LSL].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. BRAGG, supra note 129, at 35.
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children should only be removed from parents “when all other means of
safety have been considered” or when the victim is unable to protect
children and “unable . . . to accept services.”146 In short, children need to
know that it is possible for the parent to break the cycle of violence and
that parent and child will be supported during the process, and not further
harmed.
As illustrated above, separating children from parents who are
victims of domestic violence can harm children more than benefit their
well-being. Furthermore, it sends a message to children that victims are
the perpetrator by saying they “failed.”147 It also defines the problem as
“women’s failures’ as mothers rather than in terms of the [partner’s]
actions.”148
To minimize further victimization of children, courts must assess the
individual circumstances of each child. Most importantly, the court has
to look at the intensity and duration of violence the child was exposed to,
as well as their connection to their non-abusive parent and available
support system. By looking at these factors, the court can determine the
long-term effect of the abuse on children and balance whether separation
from the non-abusive parent will negatively impact the child more than
the exposure to violence.
The child protection system is overwhelmed and does not reflect the
range of experiences that children exposed to domestic violence go
through.149 In conclusion, exposure of children to domestic violence
should continue to be a factor analyzed in determining a child’s best
interest, but a one-size-fits-all solution is not the best approach for such a
complex and consequential issue.
CONCLUSION
Custody of Vaughn is a watershed moment in Massachusetts law, in
which the SJC recognized the special harms children experience when
they live in a household contaminated by physical violence. The lesson
of Vaughn is that courts must take special care when placing a child in the
custody of a parent who has abused a domestic partner. Vaughn
recognizes that while there may be circumstances in which placement with
a parent who has been abusive may be warranted, trial judges must
146. Id. at 48.
147. JENÉ TOUSSAINT, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR FAMILY-CENTERED PRAC. &
PERMANENCY PLAN., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS ROLE IN CHILD WELFARE 2 (2006),
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/information_packets/domestic_viole
nce.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CRL-P95J].
148. Lindauer, supra note 110, at 20.
149. JEFFREY L. EDLESON, NAT’L RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
EMERGING RESPONSES TO CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (2011),
https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_ChildrensExposure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TJ7U-XS5E].
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thoroughly document the appropriateness of that decision with
particularized findings.
There is no reason why the same level of scrutiny should not be
applied in cases evaluating the fitness of a parent who has been abused by
a partner. Such scrutiny is especially warranted when courts contemplate
leaving a child in the custody of the state instead of the custody of a parent.
Vaughn’s requirement of specific and detailed findings can be
implemented to prevent the tragic and unconstitutional separation of
children like Umika from a parent who loves them and wants to care for
them.

